Wendell Minnick - Articles
Tuesday, July 29, 2014
Directory of Foreign Aviation Companies in China: Commercial and Defense
In
June 2014, Minnick published a 800-page directory on foreign aviation
companies doing business in China. The book included the names of
Chinese agents/agencies handling the company account, press releases,
chronologies, speeches, and index. You can order it from Amazon.
Wednesday, October 17, 2012
China Continues its Focus on Cyber: Report
Defense News
05/18/2012
China Continues its Focus on Cyber: Report
By MARCUS
WEISGERBER and WENDELL MINNICK
WASHINGTON and TAIPEI —
China continues to invest in the development of offensive cyberwarfare
capabilities that could disrupt global computer networks, according to a new
U.S. Defense Department report.
“China is investing in not
only capabilities to better defend their networks, but also, they’re looking at
ways to use cyber for offensive operations,” said David Helvey, acting deputy
assistant defense secretary for East Asia, during a May 18 briefing at the
Pentagon.
While Helvey could not say
whether China is accelerating development of these offensive cyberwarfare
capabilities, Beijing’s actions in this area over the past year have been
sustained.
“Their continued efforts in
this area reflect the importance that they’re placing on developing
capabilities for cyberwarfare,” he said.
The report notes that in
2011, global computer networks “continued to be targets of intrusions and data
theft, many of which originated within China. Although some of the targeted
systems were U.S. government-owned, others were commercial networks owned by
private companies whose stolen data represents valuable intellectual property.”
The annual Pentagon report
— which is primarily conducted by the Pentagon’s policy office and the Defense
Intelligence Agency — has been mandated by Congress since 2000.
“We intend the report to be
factual,” Helvey said. “We try to maintain a very analytic, objective tone and
let the facts speak for themselves.”
Beijing continued
“sustained investment” in nuclear forces, short and medium-range conventional
ballistic missiles, advanced aircraft, integrated air defenses, cruise missiles,
submarines, ships and cyberwarfare capabilities, Helvey said.
“China’s military
modernization is also, to an increasing extent, focusing on investments that
would enable China’s armed forces to conduct a wide range of missions,
including those that are far from China,” he said.
That said, “preparing for
contingencies in the Taiwan Strait appears to be the principal focus and driver
for much of China’s military investment,” he said.
The Pentagon does not
expect the Chinese J-20 — an advanced fighter jet with capabilities that
analysts say are similar to advanced U.S. aircraft — to achieve an “effective
operational capability no sooner than 2018,” Helvey said.
China began sea trials of
its first aircraft carrier last year. While the ship could be operationally
ready by the end of the year, it will likely take “several additional years”
before it is able to deploy with aircraft.
Despite Beijing’s military
investments, military-to-military relations has improved in recent years, and
top defense officials from the U.S. and China have made official visits to each
country. Earlier this month, Gen. Liang Guanglie, the Chinese defense minister,
met with U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta at the Pentagon and visited a
number of military bases in the United States.
Adm. Samuel Locklear, the
head of U.S. Pacific Command, is scheduled to visit China this summer and
Panetta has been invited to China in the second half of this year.
This year’s 52-page report
was “strangely short” compared to the 94-page report in 2011, said Gary Li, a
defense analyst with London-based Exclusive Analysis. This year’s report was
“very short and condensed,” he said.
Li noted that all analysis
of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was shortened to general trends rather
than specifics. There was a “focus on China’s overall national strategy rather
than the PLA as an entity.”
DoD appears to have
abandoned the “bean counting approach” to PLA unit information, most likely
because “they were rubbish at it,” Li said.
The lack of facts and figures
in this year’s report makes it impossible to say how accurate the report is
this time, Li said. This could be “due to a more ‘softly softly’ approach to
China” following the U.S. announcement of a new strategic realignment toward
Asia, or “due to the rapidly changing character of the PLA over the past year,”
which could be the Pentagon’s way of taking a “wait and see approach,” he said.
Despite the format changes,
Helvey said the report still addresses “the same range of questions and issues
that’s requested by the Congress in the legislation.”
“We’ve streamlined and
consolidated the report in keeping with DoD-wide guidance for how we’re
handling reports to Congress,” he said.
On the positive side, the
Pentagon released this report roughly on schedule for the first time in years,
said Henry Boyd, Research Associate for Defence and Military Analysis at
London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. But on the down
side, “there seems to be little in the way of new substantive analysis, and the
same old contradictions continue to crop up.”
Boyd also noted the shorter
version of the report compared to 2011, which might explain why they were able
to release it earlier than normal.
“The chapter on ‘Force
Modernization Goals and Trends’ has gone from 15 to 5 pages and the one on
‘Resources for Force Modernization’ is effectively gone,” and Boyd asked, is
this “because the size of China’s Defense Budget isn’t an issue any more?”
To make matters worse,
there appears to be a disconnect between the text and the data.
The PLA is believed to be
reorganizing both its land and air structures to a certain extent, but no
mention is made of air force restructuring in the report, “whilst there is a
token nod in the direction of ground force changes,” Boyd said.
The report acknowledges
that in “mid-2011 the PLA began to transform its ground forces into a modular
combined arms brigade-focused structure,” but the army data in the report is
effectively the same set DoD put out last year.
The same could be said for
missile estimates where despite “acquiring and fielding greater numbers of
conventional medium-range ballistic missiles” and “continuing to produce large
numbers of ground-launched cruise missiles” as well as adding “additional
missile brigades,” DoD estimates for ballistic-missile numbers “are exactly the
same as last year, and therefore really, really similar to the ones published
the year before that,” Boyd said.
Boyd said the report has
deleted any mention or the names of senior Communist Party/PLA personnel. And
although President Hu Jintao gets one mention with regard to his January 2011
meeting with Obama, there is no discussion of leadership transition and no
organization chart of the PRC military structure.
“In general, I would
describe myself as disappointed but not surprised by the content of this
report,” Boyd said. “This year is obviously going to be a highly politicized
one on both sides of the Pacific, and U.S.-China relations have not run smooth
as of late.”
“It
is possible that the reduced transparency and analysis reflects perceptions in
the Pentagon of a more serious challenge posed by China than hitherto, and thus
a desire not to tip the hand any further than they absolutely have to,” Boyd
said. “However, you could make an equally plausible case to suggest that this
report has just been given less time and attention than it previously received
and has suffered accordingly.”
Taiwan Might Delay F-16 Upgrade
05/07/2012
Defense News
Taiwan Might Delay F-16 Upgrade
By Wendell Minnick
TAIPEI — Angry at the cost of upgrading its existing
146 F-16A/B fighters and enticed by the possible U.S. release of new F-16C/D
jets, Taiwan might delay signing a letter of acceptance (LoA) with the U.S.
government to upgrade its existing F-16 fleet.
In September 2011, the U.S. released a $5.3 billion
upgrade package that included an active electronically scanned array (AESA)
radar. The U.S. Air Force has been pressuring Taiwan to pay for nonrecurring
engineering (NRE) costs related to integrating the radar.
An NRE is the one-time cost to research, develop,
design and test a new system. AESA refits are being competed in other Asian
countries, and if Taiwan waited until South Korea made its AESA selection,
Taiwan could save money on its deal, said a Ministry of National Defense
consultant.
As the economy continues to shrink and defense
budgets take hits, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) is facing huge
hurdles as it struggles to pay for $13 billion worth of military hardware
released by the U.S. since 2008. Taiwan is also implementing costly force
structure realignment and moving from conscription to an all-volunteer system.
The White House breathed new life into Taiwan’s
efforts to buy 66 F-16C/D Block 50/52 fighters when it acknowledged Taiwan’s
need for new jets in an April 27 letter to U.S. Sen. John Cornyn, R-Texas. The
letter said Taiwan’s fighter fleet was shrinking in comparison to China’s
expanding airpower capabilities. Cornyn had been pressing for the sale.
The White House did not promise to sell F-16C/Ds to
Taiwan, but the MND is no position to ignore calls from Washington supporters
to push the envelope on securing the fighter.
Since 2006, Taiwan has attempted to submit a letter
of request (LoR) for price-and-availability data for F-16C/Ds on four occasions
but was convinced by U.S. State Department officials to retract the request due
to timing issues and fears it would lead to a negative policy decision that
could affect future arms sales.
However, supporters in Washington are now hopeful.
The letter has generated momentum after a long period of inertia, said Rupert
Hammond-Chambers, president of the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council. The next
logical step is for Taiwan to issue the LoR to the American Institute in Taiwan
(AIT). Otherwise, recent efforts will be in vain, he said.
Taiwan cannot afford both the A/B upgrade and new
F-16C/Ds, said a Taiwan defense analyst. There is a lack of will within the Taiwan
government to “fund such a costly new program, especially on top of the $5.3
billion F-16A/B upgrade,” since the government “has consistently failed to live
up to the level of defense spending promised.
“Logically, therefore, it would seem to make the most
sense for Taiwan to hold off making a final decision on the F-16A/B upgrade, at
least until the situation vis-Ã -vis the new buy sufficiently clarifies,” he
said.
“If the new buy does go ahead, there will be enormous
pressure on the budget, and the Taiwan Air Force may be compelled to
aggressively look for cuts and cost savings in the A/B upgrade program.”
There are also concerns in Taipei and Washington that
the release of F-16C/Ds would destroy progress made to improve cross-strait
ties with Beijing, which have grown to historic levels since 2008.
The other budget concern involves MND complaints over
efforts by the U.S. Air Force to force Taiwan to pay for the NRE for the A/B
upgrade AESA radar, which was not included in the original $5.3 billion price
tag.
The Raytheon Advanced Combat Radar and the Northrop
Grumman Scalable Agile Beam Radar are fighting over AESA refits for Singapore,
South Korea and Taiwan F-16 programs.
If Taiwan pays for the NRE, it would save the U.S.
taxpayer money when the U.S. Air Force begins integrating the new radar on 350
F-16 Block 40/50 fighters in an upcoming $2.8 billion program, said a U.S.
defense industry source based in Taipei. If the MND just slowed down the
negotiation process and refused to sign the LoA until South Korea made its AESA
selection, he said, Taiwan would “save a ton of money.”
An MND consultant said Taiwan was “getting a raw
deal” from the U.S., and the additional money Taiwan has to spend to pay for
the NRE will “break the bank.” Getting the intellectual property rights or a
reduction in the price would compensate Taiwan, he said. If not, MND
policymakers will have to take into account the overall budget crunch before
deciding on any additional spending.
But Taiwan might have little choice now but to go
forward on the A/B upgrade, with or without the NRE price tag. Since 2006, the
U.S. has consistently denied Taiwan’s request for F-16C/Ds, and the White House
letter was “ambiguous” and did not “specify when Taiwan should make the pitch,”
the MND consultant said.
He said, “We need
to see beyond that letter if the Pentagon will have any additional guidance
from the White House.”
U.S. May Sell 4 F-35s to Japan
Defense News
05/02/2012
U.S. May Sell 4 F-35s to Japan
By
Wendell Minnick
TAIPEI,
Taiwan — The U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress
on April 30 of a possible $10 billion foreign military sale to Japan for an
initial four F-35A Joint Strike Fighter Conventional Take-Off and Landing
(CTOL) aircraft with an option for an additional 38 F-35 CTOL aircraft.
The
announcement was made in a DSCA press release on May 1.
The
deal will include five spare Pratt and Whitney F-135 engines; command, control,
communications, computer and intelligence capabilities, navigational systems;
electronic warfare systems; an autonomic logistics global support system; an
autonomic logistics information system; and a flight mission trainer.
It
will also include unique infrared flares, a reprogramming center and
performance-based logistics.
“Japan
is one of the major political and economic powers in East Asia and the Western
Pacific and a key ally of the United States in ensuring the peace and stability
of this region,” said the DSCA press release. “The U.S. government shares bases
and facilities in Japan. This proposed sale is consistent with these U.S.
objectives and with the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.”
The
F-35 beat Boeing’s F/A-18 Super Hornet and Eurofighter’s Typhoon in Japan’s
competition to replace aging Mitsubishi-built F-4EJ Kai Phantoms. Japan’s F-4
aircraft will be decommissioned as F-35s are added to the inventory.
There
are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
Implementation
of the proposed sale could take as long as 15 years, according to the press
release, but industry sources indicated deliveries could begin as early as
2016.
The
number of JSFs could expand to 100-120 F-35As for the F-XX program to replace
the Mitsubishi F-15J/DJ Eagles.
Contractor
representatives will be in Japan to conduct engineering technical services and
autonomic logistics and global support for after-aircraft delivery, according
to the press release.
During
the Singapore Airshow in February, Lockheed Martin’s Dave Scott, director of
F-35 international customer engagement, said that with U.S. government
approval, Lockheed offered Japan as an F-35A final assembly and check-out site,
“which is where they put the four major structural components of the airplane
together, install the engines and all the electronic systems, do the codings,
do the test flights.”
Lockheed
is also offering construction of major structural components and subcomponents,
engine assembly, integration and test, and light maintenance and repair, he
said.
Dispute Simmers: Five Scenarios for Renewed China-Philippines Conflict
Defense News
04/30/2012
Dispute Simmers
Five Scenarios
for Renewed China-Philippines Conflict
TAIPEI — The
standoff between China and the Philippines over Chinese fishing boats poaching
in the Scarborough Shoal that began April 8 appears to be easing. But defense
analysts point to Beijing’s continued failure to ignore regional exclusive
economic zones (EEZs) and rein in competitive maritime enforcement agencies.
A new report,
issued April 23 by the International Crisis Group (ICG), blames China’s
disjointed and competitive maritime patrol agencies fighting over budgets and
turf.
The ICG report
— titled “Stirring Up The South China Sea” — identifies four “dragons” as the
main culprits: Maritime Safety Administration, China Marine Surveillance (CMS),
Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC) and provincial government maritime
enforcement units operating from Guangdong and Hainan.
Part of the
problem is transparency about how the overlapping agencies function, said Ian
Storey, a specialist at Singapore’s Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. “It
is also unclear what the lines of communication are between these various
agencies and the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] and central government.”
Each of the
agencies sets its own agenda, said Carlyle Thayer, a professor at University of
New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, “especially FLEC and
CMS, both have been responsible for nearly all the major incidents in recent
years.”
Thayer
identified five potential scenarios that could play out in a future dispute
between China and the Philippines.
Scenario 1: Chinese fishing boats continue to fish in the
Philippines’ EEZ. In this scenario, the Philippine Coast Guard attempts to
arrest fishermen at Scarborough Shoal. The fishermen display automatic weapons
and call for assistance. Chinese
surveillance ships intervene and move aggressively to force the Coast Guard
vessel away. One Chinese fisherman fires at the Coast Guard vessel with an
assault rifle; the Coast Guard vessel fires warning shots. This is
misinterpreted by one of the Chinese surveillance ships, which rams the Coast
Guard vessel. The crews on both vessels engage in a brief firefight leading to
fatalities before calm is restored.
This scenario
is both the “most likely and the most troubling,” said retired U.S. Navy Adm.
Walter Doran, former commander of U.S. Pacific Fleet. “I am sure the Chinese have
little respect for the Philippine capability to defend their claims and assets,
and therefore they are least likely to put up with any push back from the
Philippines.”
However, a
firefight between Chinese fishermen and Philippine Coast Guard vessels appears
unlikely, said Gary Li, an analyst at U.K.-based Exclusive Analysis. “Not very
likely, as Chinese fishing vessels and fishermen are not armed with anything
other than maybe a hook,” Li said. Chinese surveillance vessels would also not
engage in a firefight in such an open way, he said. “Chinese paramilitaries
have to clear everything with headquarters, and this kind of escalation would
be very damaging so not likely to be allowed.”
Scenario 2: Chinese officials in the FLEC grow tired of foreign
affairs “dilly-dallying and the standoff at Scarborough Shoal,” Thayer said. At
night, an armed FLEC party boards and takes over the Philippine Coast Guard
cutter on the pretext of detaining a vessel operating illegally in Chinese
waters. “If you accept that China has sovereignty over the rocks at Scarborough
Shoal and these are entitled to a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea, China could
argue a stationary Coast Guard cutter is not engaged in innocent passage,” he
said.
“Direct
boarding of anything other than a fishing vessel is not likely to be attempted
by any Chinese marine paramilitaries,” Li said. “They are far too cowardly and
cautious, unless they’ve been given a direct order, in which case they might attempt
ramming action.” Storey also felt this scenario was unlikely and “too Tom
Clancy.”
Scenario 3: While the Philippines is engaged in the standoff at Scarborough
Shoal, China dispatches a FLEC ship into the Spratly waters claimed by the
Philippines to assist Chinese fishermen claiming harassment by Filipino
fishermen.
The Philippines
does not have any Coast Guard ships available, so it dispatches the Navy
frigate Gregorio del Pilar. Both sides refuse to stand down, and when the FLEC ship
maneuvers dangerously, the frigate fires warning shots. The Chinese return
fire, hitting the frigate and killing several crew members.
The problem
with this scenario is the Chinese have already withdrawn their largest
fisheries vessel, the Yuzheng 310, in a gesture of goodwill and an attempt at
de-escalating the issue, Li said. This points to the Chinese not having the
confidence or political will to take this further. “The Chinese paramilitary vessels
wouldn’t dare fire upon a foreign military vessel, as this would be an open
declaration of war,” he said, and “their 12.7mm machine guns won’t do much
damage and the small Filipino frigates can still blast them full of holes in
return.”
Storey believes
this scenario is still plausible. “Frankly speaking, I think it’s just a
question of time before we see a firefight in the [South China Sea and] it
would likely be sparked by a dispute over fisheries or oil and gas exploration.
It could easily get out of hand.”
Scenario 4: During the standoff at Scarborough Shoal, both sides plant
flags on the rocks signifying sovereignty. One day, two landing parties
confront each other and shooting breaks out when one side attempts to stop the
other from removing its flag. An armed Chinese vessel appears and provides
covering fire. Several Filipino troops are killed. The Philippines requests
consultations with the U.S. under the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT).
The overhanging
question of the MDT with the Philippines will have to be dealt with, Doran
said. This will become more of an issue as the U.S. pivots forces to the
Pacific and considers a closer relationship with the Philippines. “We have once
again learned to live with a lot of ambiguity in the relationship, but an
aggressive China demands that we clearly re-think the commitments on both sides
of the treaty,” Doran said.
“My primary
concern is China building structures similar to what they did on Mischief Reef
in 1995,” said Renato Cruz De Castro of De La Salle University in Manila. “They
will take control of Scarborough Shoal, build a structure for fishermen to shelter,
and improve it with radar and communications facilities.”
Building
structures on the shoal will prevent the Philippines from exercising its
territorial rights to the shoal on the basis of the U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea, and also allow the Chinese to monitor U.S. Navy communications once
Subic Bay becomes available for its use in the light of current negotiation
between Manila and Washington for a greater U.S. strategic footprint in the
Philippines, he said.
The problem is
that the Philippines did not formally claim sovereignty of the Spratly Islands
until 1978, “so the U.S. position is that the 1951 MDT does not cover them,” Storey
said, though consultations would be required.
Scenario 5: The standoff at Scarborough Shoal ends when the Philippines
withdraws its Coast Guard cutter. China sends in personnel to occupy the rocks
and erect structures. A Chinese Navy warship is posted nearby to deter a
Filipino response. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) falls into
complete disarray over how to respond, so it does nothing. The Philippines
calls for consultations with the U.S. under the MDT, arguing that it has lost territory
due to external armed intervention.
U.S.
credibility is put on the line. China begins to renew its harassment of U.S.
Navy surveillance ships and aircraft operating in its EEZ as a signal to the
U.S. to back off. The U.S. provides armed escorts for its ships and aircraft.
Tensions increase dramatically.
“As for ASEAN —
it would either close ranks behind the Philippines (as ASEAN did over
Vietnamese incursions into Thai territory in 1980) or split and be rendered
impotent,” Storey said. “My money would be on the latter.”
“I think the
increase in U.S. involvement will definitely happen, but I don’t think the
Chinese will try and erect structures so close to the Philippine coast,” Li
said. “It would be almost impossible for them to defend effectively and they
don’t have assets that can be rotated out in an effective manner.”
The five
scenarios roughly coincide with Doran’s greatest concerns over the South China
Sea situation. “I worry that eventually one side or the other will make a
miscalculation or some minor player will overreact to events and an
uncontrollable series of events will unfold.”
Doran’s main
worry is about the Philippines due to the emotions that are in play, and
Filipino forces’ lack of training and real capability. “Whereas Vietnam and
Indonesia,
among others,
are also subject to potential events, the Philippines, in my estimation are
most likely to handle the whole thing badly and get in over their heads.”
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