Defense News
08/24/2011
Pentagon: Mil-to-mil
ties with China critical
By Kate Brannen and Wendell Minnick - Staff writers
WASHINGTON And TAIPEI — The
release of the 2011 annual Pentagon report on Chinese military modernization
has become a lightning rod for critics on both sides of the Pacific. Those in
Washington say it lacks substance, and those in Beijing complain the report is
part of a U.S. conspiracy to contain China.
“Military and Security
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” is not the original name
of the report. Two years ago, elements in the U.S. government decided to change
the name from “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China” in an effort
to soften the tone and hopefully not anger China.
In its annual report to
Congress, the Pentagon presents a diplomatic but watchful stance toward the
country and urges stronger military-to-military relationships between the two
powers.
“Although China’s expanding
military capabilities can facilitate cooperation in pursuit of shared
objectives, they can also increase the risk of misunderstanding and
miscalculation,” the report, released Aug. 24, says. “Strengthening our military-to-military
relationship is a critical part of our strategy to shape China’s choices as we
seek to capitalize on opportunities for cooperation while mitigating risks.”
The 83-page report comes months
after its March 1 deadline. It also follows reports that the United States has
decided to deny Taiwan’s request for 66 new F-16 C/D fighter jets and instead
upgrade Taiwan’s existing fleet of older F-16A/Bs. China had described the sale
as a “red line.” The Pentagon report fails to mention the F-16C/D issue.
In January 2010, the Chinese
government suspended military-to-military relations with the United States,
following U.S. approval of a separate arms sale to Taiwan.
“Although the United States and
China maintained working level contact during the nine-month suspension that
followed, routine military-to-military exchanges did not resume until the final
quarter of 2010,” the report says.
According to the report, the
United States would now like to see those relationships strengthened.
“This interaction can facilitate
common approaches to challenges and serves as a bridge to build more productive
working relationships,” the report says.
The report highlights China’s
participation in counterpiracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden as one of its
important engagements with foreign militaries.
In the realm of cyberwarfare,
the report notes that of the thousands of “intrusions” of computer systems
around the world in 2010, some appear to have originated in China. These
intrusions were focused on stealing information, according to the report.
“Although this alone is a
serious concern, the accesses and skills required for these intrusions are
similar to those necessary to conduct computer network attacks,” the report
says, noting that network attacks can serve as a force multiplier when combined
with more traditional forms of warfare.
In addition to its growing
military might, China also holds about 8 percent of U.S. debt, the largest
block in foreign hands. A search of the document for the word “debt” came up
with no matches.
As for military spending, on
March 4, Beijing announced a 12.7 percent increase in its military budget,
saying it would spend approximately $91.5 billion. However, the Defense
Department estimates that China’s total military-related spending for 2010 was
more than $160 billion.
As a point of comparison, in
2011, the U.S. base defense budget was $530 billion, which does not include
expenditures on Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States continues to urge China
to increase transparency when it comes to its military spending. According to
the Pentagon, producing the report cost just over $73,000, compared with a $2.5
million report on the reserve component published April 5.
Beijing’s strategy is
illustrated by Deng Xiaoping, who said that China must “hide our capabilities
and bide our time.” This statement explains a lot about China’s tendency to
ignore transparency requests and to simply wait when an opportunity presents
itself.
In the report, an item of major
concern is Chinese missile development.
“The [People’s Liberation Army]
is acquiring large numbers of highly accurate cruise missiles, many of which
have ranges in excess of 185 km.” This includes the DH-10 land-attack cruise
missile, the ship-launch YJ-62 anti-ship cruise missile and the Russian SS-N-22
Sunburn supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles.
Much of this information is the
same as from previous Pentagon reports.
The report does mention the
DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, but only three times. The DF-21D has been
dubbed by the media as the “aircraft carrier killer,” and billboards in China
have shown U.S. Navy aircraft carriers being sunk after being saturated by
DF-21D missiles. The Pentagon report does not discuss how this type of missile
might reshape naval strategy and doctrine.
In another odd section, the
report says that China “may also be developing a new road-mobile
intercontinental ballistic missile, possibly capable of carrying a multiple
independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV).” Then the report drops the
issue from discussion. It does not explain the significance of a road-mobile
ICBM carrying MIRVed nuclear warheads, or what that potentially could mean to
the U.S. West Coast.
China is also developing
long-range stealthy aircraft capable of challenging U.S. air power in the
region. China has 490 combat aircraft within operational range of Taiwan and
has the airfield capabilities to expand that number by hundreds.
The January flight of China’s
next-generation fighter prototype, the J-20, highlights China’s ambition to
produce a fighter aircraft that incorporates stealth attributes, advanced
avionics and super-cruise capable engines over the next several years.
According to the report, China
is upgrading its B-6 bomber fleet with a long-range variant that will be armed
with a new long-range cruise missile.
In comparison, the Taiwanese are
still waiting after five years for the U.S. to release 66 F-16C/D fighter
aircraft and an upgrade package for 146 F-16A/B fighters. The report fails to
mention Taiwan’s long delayed F-16C/D request. Nor is there any mention of
Taiwan’s request for submarines.
What the report really lacks is
a future picture of what Taiwan would look like if it became a confederacy of
China’s. What would PLA bases on Taiwan mean for Japan, Korea and the United
States? What if there was a fighter wing of Su-30s at Haulian Air Base, a
submarine base at Suao Port, and a B-6 bomber base at CCK Air Base in Taichung?
How
would such developments reshape the strategic map for the Pacific Command? How
would Japan deal with the problem of securing oil shipments from the sea lanes
of the Malacca Strait and South China Sea? What if China said “no” to Japan?
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