Defense News
08/23/2011
Taiwan Report
Ambiguous On Chinese Threat
By WENDELL MINNICK
TAIPEI - Taiwan's
Ministry of National Defense (MND) released the English-language version of its
biennial 11th National Defense Report during an Aug. 22 press conference.
Members of the media
attending the conference received the report, a comic book version of the
report, an 8-inch action figure (a Taiwan Navy officer peering through
binoculars) and a 2-inch bobblehead doll of a smiling MND officer.
Like past National
Defense reports, ambiguous terms are used to describe China's military threat.
China is deploying "various ballistic and cruise missiles." China is
developing "anti-access/area denial" capabilities. The Second
Artillery Corps "has some capability of attacking aircraft carriers."
According to "foreign and domestic think tanks," the Chinese Navy
will deploy aircraft carriers by 2020. "Asia-Pacific countries remain
suspicious" of China's military modernization efforts.
The report is
remarkably weak in comparison with the Pentagon's controversial annual Report
on China's Military Modernization, expected to be released this week. The MND
report fails to mention that China has about 1,500 short-range ballistic
missiles aimed at Taiwan. Though Taiwan is working harder not to offend China
since Ma Ying-jeou won the Taiwan presidency in 2008, past reports have always
been light on details and nonconfrontational.
The report
acknowledges that cross-strait ties have improved since 2008, and the signing
of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement in June 2010 further enhanced
peaceful co-existence, though "its long-term effects on our participation
in regional economic integration will require further evaluation."
From a military
perspective, China's threat to Taiwan remains "unabated," though the
report fails to be explicit.
Of interest, the
report does indicate that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has added the
People's Armed Police (PAP) to "its array of forces for operations against
Taiwan."
The PAP is a
paramilitary police force known for its brutality in the autonomous regions of
Tibet and Xinjiang Uyghur. The MND report fails to mention PAP's history of
thuggery, or what Taiwan's citizenry might expect from PAP forces if they were
to occupy the island.
Local defense
analysts said they expect widespread systematic rape and pillaging during an
invasion in an effort to subjugate the island's residents.
The report outlines
the various campaigns PLA could wage against Taiwan, beginning with the likely
use of military intimidation, a partial blockade, "firepower strikes"
and, finally, invasion.
Military intimidation
strategies would include intensifying military activities, adjusting
deployment, and using the media to publicize military risks in the Taiwan
Strait with the objective of causing a panic in Taiwan.
The PLA also may use
its Air Force and Navy to set up partial blockades against Taiwan's key ports
and harass the outer islands, which would "weaken the morale of our
military and civilians, sever our economic lifeline, deteriorate our living
environment, and force us to seek peace agreements."
The PLA's Second
Artillery Corps also could launch missiles to destroy command-and-control hubs,
political and economic centers and symbolic targets. The attacks would begin
slowly and escalate to cripple Taiwan's air defense, sea control and
counterstrike systems, "thus shattering our will to fight, forcing us to
surrender, or creating a foundation for subsequent strategic operations."
China also might use
a "Triphibian Invasion" with the following sequence: preliminary
engagement, electromagnetic control operations, air superiority operations, sea
control operations and landing. China will "aim for a short battle and a
quick victory before foreign forces [the U.S. military] can intervene, thus
establishing a political reality that will prevent further intervention."
The report concludes
that a Normandy-style invasion of Taiwan is not a likely option. China lacks
the amphibious transport craft needed to successfully invade Taiwan. No mention
is made in the report of past concerns about a decapitation strategy using
special operations forces and fifth column elements to take the capital city of
Taipei first.
None of these
scenarios are new.
The report makes
little mention of Taiwan's dependence on U.S. military support in the event of
a war. Taiwan's request for new F-16C/D fighter jets is only mentioned once in
the report.
Due to Chinese
pressure, the U.S. has delayed the release of F-16C/Ds and submarines since
2006 and 2001, respectively. The U.S. State Department has indicated that a
decision on the F-16C/Ds would be made by Oct. 1, which is China's National
Day.
The report redefines
the word "victory" in terms of fighting a war with China. "Considering
the military strength of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, we must use a
practical attitude to reconsider the definition of 'victory' if we are to
achieve 'resolute defense and credible deterrence.'"
Therefore, the report
says the definition of "victory" has been readjusted from
"defeating the enemy in a full confrontation" to "striking the
enemy halfway across the Taiwan Strait and preventing the enemy from landing
and establishing lodgment."
The meaning of
"victory" is redefined because "the force structure of the Armed
Forces was planned with a focus on gaining a relative advantage in this
critical period of war."
The result will
allow for a "small and superb, strong and smart" force to achieve
"resolute defense," but also avoid engaging in an "armaments
race" with China, which might influence Taiwan's overall competitiveness.
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